Week 11
Ethnicity and Identity

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
May 20, 2022

Australian National University

Let's start taking a survey:

https://forms.gle/4fSeR9ov41QnjorK8

What do you think the current population of your country is?

Country	% difference	Avg. guess (92m)	Actual (95m)
Hong Kong	+10%	8	7.31
Taiwan*	+6%	25	23.51
Denmark	+6%	6	5.68
Montenegro*	+5%	0.65	0.62
Thailand	+3%	70	67.96
Russia	+2%	147	144.10
Turkey*	+2%	80	78.74
Hungary	+2%	10	9.84
Argentina	+1%	44	43.42
Great Britain*	+1%	64	63.26
Sweden*	+1%	10	9.92
Mexico*	0%	120	119.53
Netherlands	0%	17	16.94
Germany*	0%	82	82.18
Philippines*	-1%	100	100.98
Australia*	-1%	24	24.25
Chile*	-1%	18	18.19
Malaysia	-1%	30	30.33
Poland*	-1%	38	38.42
Peru	-1%	31	31.38
South Korea	-1%	50	50.62
Italy	-1%	60	60.80
Serbia*	-1%	7	7.10
Vietnam	-2%	90	91.70
Canada	-2%	35	35.85
Belgium*	-2%	11	11.27
Colombia	-3%	47	48.23
France*	-3%	65	66.76
Spain	-3%	45	46.42
Indonesia	-3%	250	257.56
Brazil	-4%	200	207.85
Norway*	-5%	5	5.24
Israel	-5%	8	8.38
China	-5%	1300	1371.22
Czech Republic	-5%	10	10.55
South Africa	-5%	52	54.96
Japan	-5%	120	126.96
US	-7%	300	321.42
Singapore	-10%	5	5.54

too low   too high

What percentage of the population do you think are immigrants (i.e., not born in this country)?

	% point difference	too low | too high	Avg. guess	Actual
Argentina		+25	30	5
Brazil		+25	25	0.3
South Africa		+24	29	5
Mexico		+21	22	1
Peru		+21	21	0.3
India		+21	21	0.4
Russia		+19	27	8
United States		+19	33	14
Canada		+18	39	21
Chile		+17	19	2
Colombia		+17	17	0.3
Italy		+17	26	9
Serbia		+16	22	6
France		+14	26	12
Germany		+14	26	12
Belgium		+14	24	10
Netherlands		+13	25	12
Great Britain		+12	25	13
New Zealand		+12	37	25
China		+11	11	0.1
Australia		+10	38	28
Hungary		+10	15	5
Sweden		+9	25	16
South Korea		+8	11	3
Spain		+8	22	14
Japan		+8	10	2
Montenegro		+8	16	8
Poland		+7	9	2
Ireland		+7	23	16
Norway		+2	16	14
Israel	-3		24	27
Saudi Arabia	-7		24	31

Source: Ipsos (2017) and Duffy (2018).

Out of every 100 people, about how many do you think are Muslim?

Country	% point difference	Avg. guess (19)	Actual (10.2)
France	+24	31	7.5
South Africa	+21	22	1.7
Philippines	+17	23	5.5
Italy	+17	20	3.7
Germany*	+16	21	5.0
Belgium*	+16	23	7.0
US	+16	17	1.0
Russia	+14	24	10.0
Canada*	+14	17	3.2
India*	+14	28	14.2
Sweden	+13	17	4.6
Netherlands	+13	19	6.0
Brazil	+12	12	<0.1
Spain	+11	14	2.1
Singapore*	+11	25	14.0
Thailand*	+11	16	4.9
Great Britain	+11	15	4.8
Denmark	+11	15	4.1
Australia	+10	12	2.4
Serbia*	+10	13	3.1
Mexico*	+8	8	<0.1
Norway	+8	12	3.7
Chile	+8	8	<0.1
Hong Kong	+8	10	1.8
Poland	+7	7	<0.1
Colombia	+7	7	<0.1
Taiwan	+7	7	<0.1
South Korea	+6	7	0.2
Hungary	+6	6	<0.1
Japan	+6	6	0.2
Vietnam	+5	6	0.2
Peru	+5	5	<0.1
Montenegro*	+5	24	19.1
Argentina	+5	6	1.0
Israel	+5	23	18.6
Malaysia	+4	68	63.7
Czech Republic	+3	3	<0.1
Indonesia	-7	80	87.2
Turkey	-17	81	98.0

too low   too high

Source: Ipsos (2017) and Duffy (2018). *Note:* *Data from another source.

Out of every 100 prisoners in [COUNTRY], about how many do you think were born in a foreign country?

Country or district	% point difference			Avg. guess (28)	Actual (15)
	too low		too high		
Netherlands		+32%		51	19.1
South Africa		+31%		37	6.3
France		+28%		49	21.7
USA		+27%		32	5.2
New Zealand		+25%		27	1.9
Argentina		+25%		31	6.2
Great Britain		+23%		34	11.8
Peru		+22%		24	2.1
Australia		+21%		40	18.7
Singapore		+21%		30	9.9
Mexico		+20%		21	1.2
Denmark		+19%		47	28.0
Russia		+18%		23	4.3
Brazil		+18%		18	0.4
Chile		+18%		21	3.4
Philippines		+17%		17	0.4
Norway		+16%		50	33.8
India		+16%		17	1.5
Indonesia		+16%		16	0.6
Colombia		+15%		15	0.8
Italy		+14%		48	34.4
Japan		+14%		19	5.6
Germany		+14%		45	31.3
Turkey		+13%		16	2.1
Spain		+12%		40	28.2
Poland		+11%		12	1.0
Hungary		+11%		16	4.9
China		+11%		11	0.4
Belgium		+9%		54	45.0
Serbia		+8%		11	3.5
South Korea		+8%		11	3.5
Israel		+3%		42	38.9
Malaysia		+2%		31	29.1
Sweden		+1%		32	30.9
Montenegro		+1%		16	15.1
Hong Kong	-14%			16	29.9
Saudi Arabia	-46%			26	72.0

Source: Ipsos (2017) and Duffy (2018).

Australian Muslim Population (In Percentage)

Australian Muslim Population (%) vs Year

- 2010: 2.4
- 2020: 3
- 2030: 3.6
- 2040: 4.2
- 2050: 4.9

Changes in violent crime across metropolitan areas in the United States between 2007 and 2016

Source: Pew Research Center; F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting program

Notes: Each dot represents a metropolitan area. Changes are per 100,000 people.

Changes in property crime across metropolitan areas in the United States between 2007 and 2016

Source: Pew Research Center; F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reporting program

Notes: Each dot represents a metropolitan area. Changes are per 100,000 people.

Refugee: A person who leaves his or her country due to a well-founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, political views, or membership in a particular social group.

Migrant: A person who moves to a foreign country for various reasons—e.g., for employment, education, or to reunite with family. Unlike refugees, migrants do not face a direct threat of persecution or death in their home country.

Asylum Seeker: A person who has moved across international borders in search of protection and filed a claim for asylum—i.e., shelter or protection from danger—with the host country's government.

What countries are most refugees from?

Syrian Arab Republic
6.7 million

Venezuela
4.0 million

Afghanistan
2.6 million

South Sudan
2.2 million

Myanmar
1.1 million

Source: UNHCR (2021).

More than two thirds (68 per cent) of all refugees and Venezuelans displaced abroad came from

What countries are most refugees hosted?

Turkey 3.7 million	
Colombia 1.7 million	
Pakistan 1.4 million	
Uganda 1.4 million	
Germany 1.2 million	

How refugee migration shapes the attitudes, policy
preferences, and political behavior of citizens?

FIGURE 3. Map of the Aegean Sea

Source: Hangartner et al. (2019, p. 449).

FIGURE 4.   2SLS Regression Estimates of the Impact of Refugee Arrivals

Note: 2SLS regression estimates (with 95% confidence intervals based on cluster-robust standard errors) of the impact of refugee arrivals, instrumented with the island's distance to the Turkish coast, on respondents' attitudes (green), policy preferences (blue), and PCA-based summary measure (black).

Source: Hangartner et al. (2019, p. 450).

Direct exposure to refugee arrivals induces:

▶ Sizable and lasting increases in natives' hostility toward refugees, immigrants, and Muslim minorities;

▶ Support for restrictive asylum and immigration policies, and;

▶ Political engagement to effect such exclusionary policies.

► Hangartner et al.'s findings (2019) challenge both standard economic and cultural explanations of anti-immigrant sentiment, and;

► Show that mere exposure suffices in generating lasting increases in hostility against refugees.

- ▶ Facts vs. perception;

- ▶ The authors claim that,
  "because refugees quickly left the islands for other
  European countries, the usual materialist concerns that
  immigrants compete with natives over scarce resources
  such as jobs or welfare benefits do not apply" (p. 444).

  - ▶ Where are these refugees going next?

  - ▶ Are respondents concern about their country in general, or
    about their island?

- ▶ External shocks:

  - ▶ Brexit;
  - ▶ Islamist terrorist attacks: Manchester Arena and London
    Bridge.

- ▶ Positive effects conditional on performance;

- ▶ Political activism;

- ▶ Underlying the mechanisms through which parasocial contact can shape prejudice.

Research Question: Can exposure to celebrities from stigmatized groups reduce prejudice?

Let's watch a video:

https://youtu.be/QDkqE1D8VAE.

Contact hypothesis (Allport 1954)

Personal contact across social lines can reduce prejudice if that contact is positive, endorsed by communal authorities, egalitarian, and involves cooperating to achieve a common goal.

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Parasocial contact hypothesis (Schiappa, Gregg, and Hewes 2005)

Mediated contact with celebrities or characters from out-groups has the potential to reduce prejudice toward the out-group as a whole.

Why Salah?

Why Salah?

Salah meets the three hypothesized criteria for parasocial contact to reduce prejudice:

1. Positive exposure;

2. Repeated exposure, and;

3. Salient out-group identity.

Islamophobia (Sheridan 2006)

Fear, hatred, or dislike of Islam or Muslims, as well as anti-Muslim prejudicial attitudes or behaviors more generally.

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FIGURE 1. Attitudes toward Islam in the British Public between 2015 and 2018

Note: Source: The YouGov-Cambridge Center. The vertical axis is the percentage of survey respondents stating that "there is a fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British society." Points are weighted averages within survey waves; the trend line is a GAM fit to all 34,409 survey respondents using survey weights.

Source: Alrababa'h et al. (2021, p. 1113).

Hate crime

A crime in which the perpetrator targeted the victim mainly on the basis of their religious, racial, sexual, or abilities-based identity.

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FIGURE 2. Synthetic Control Results for Hate Crimes Analysis

Treatment effect estimates for Merseyside and placebo units

Note:
The panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes. In the posttreatment period, this is the estimate of the treatment effect. The black line shows the estimates obtained for Merseyside, and the gray lines show the estimates obtained when we treat each of the control units as if it were treated. The fact that the Merseyside estimates are consistently lower than the control group estimates provides evidence that our treatment effect estimates are unlikely to be due to chance.

*Source:* Alrababa'h et al. (2021, p. 1117).

FIGURE 4. **Synthetic Control Results for Twitter Data**

Estimated ATT in every period (Liverpool F.C. vs. Other Clubs)

Note:
The panel shows the difference between the observed and imputed outcomes. In the posttreatment period, this is the estimate of the treatment effect.
In the posttreatment period, this is the estimate of the ATT for Liverpool compared with that of other prominent English clubs.

Source: Alrababa'h et al. (2021, p. 1120).

FIGURE 5.   Coefficient Plots Representing the Main Effect of the Religiosity Treatment on the Four Outcomes Relative to the Pure Control Condition

Note: The top outcome represents the first principal component of the other three outcomes and has a mean of zero and unit variance. The other three outcomes are binary. The bars show 95% robust confidence intervals.

Source: Alrababa'h et al. (2021, p. 1123).

Research Question: How do stigmatized minorities advance agendas when confronted with hostile majorities?

Answer: Subordinate group protest strategies play a critical role in determining how minority concerns are framed by the majority-oriented press.

**FIGURE 2. Model of How Activist Agenda Seeding Influences Media and Politics**

| 1. Subordinate group: agenda seeding | 2. State: counter-action | 3. Media: agenda setting, issue framing | 4. Elites & masses: elite discourse, public opinion, voting |

Subordinate group activists seek to elevate concerns

Protesters nonviolent
- *i* → State nonviolent *March on Wash.*
- *ii* → State violent *Selma, AL*

Agenda setting and issue framing for "rights"

Move median elites and masses toward subordinate group-aligned coalition

Protesters violent
- *iii* → State nonviolent *Albany, GA*
- *iv* → State violent *Watts uprising*

Agenda setting and issue framing for "riots" and "disorder"

Move median elites and masses toward dominant group-aligned coalition

Source: Wasow (2020, p. 642).

FIGURE 3. Panel Models of Effect of Protest on Change in Presidential Vote Share, 1964–72

Note: Each point represents a coefficient (along with the 90 and 95% confidence intervals) for the estimated effect of protests on change in county-level Democratic vote share in the presidential elections of 1964, 1968, and 1972 with county fixed effects. Models using DCA data measure protest activity using participants ≥10 and, with Carter data, arrests ≥10. Other specifications can be seen in the Online Appendix.

Source: Wasow (2020, p. 648).

FIGURE 4.   IV Models of Effect of Violent Protests in April 1968 on White Vote Share

Note: Coefficient plot of estimated effects of violent protest in April 1968 on change in county–level Democratic vote share in presidential election in November 1968. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 are placebo tests that use rainfall during period with few or no protests. Models 2, 4, and 6 use CBPS weights to match. Protests data source: Carter (1986). No analysis of nonviolent protests is included as the DCA data record few nonviolent or violent protests in April 1968.

Source: Wasow (2020, p. 649).

► **Thursday, 19 May.**

Week 12. Foreign Policy and War Voting

Compulsory readings:

– Gadarian, Shana Kushner. 2010. "Foreign policy at the ballot box: How citizens use foreign policy to judge and choose candidates." *The Journal of Politics* 72(4): 1046– 1062.

– Koch, Michael T. and Nicholson, Stephen P. 2016. "Death and turnout: The human costs of war and voter participation in democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4): 932–946.