Week 8
The Limits of Political Accountability

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Let's start taking a survey:

https://forms.gle/9WDTmTWEZyvHfnxV9

Consensus in the discipline:

▶ Corruption is not a benefit to democracy (Elster 1989; Johnston 2005; Lessig 2011; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Rothstein 2005; Thompson 1995; Warren 2006):

  ▶ It corrodes the norms, processes, and mechanisms of democracy itself.

Some exceptions:

▶ Little bit of corruption that comes with democracies makes them work better (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Huntington 1968; Leys 1965):

  ▶ By lowering transaction costs;

  ▶ Reducing the inefficiencies of cumbersome rules, and;

  ▶ Generally making things happen.

► Ian Senior's (2006) definition of corruption consists of five conditions.

► Corruption is an action from a corruptor:

1. to covertly

2. provide a good or a service to a corruptee (third party) to influence

3. certain actions of the corruptee which

4. benefit the corruptor, a third party, or both in which the corruptee has

5. authority.

Protagonist	Action	(1) Covert?	(2) Favour involved?	(3) Influences corruptee's action?	(4) Benefits corruptee or nominee?	(5) Within corruptee's authority?	Result: Action was corrupt?
UK							
1 A prime minister	Receives donation for his party						
	Favours the donor's case	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
2 A lawyer	Obtains discounts on the purchase of flats						
	Advises on a legal case	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
3 An MP	Takes cash for putting down parliamentary questions	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Elsewhere							
4 A mayor	Gives free flats to friends/supporters	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5 A European Commissioner	Appoints her dentist as a scientific adviser without duties	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6 A French president	Siphons public cash into a German political party	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7 An American president	Made his brother Attorney General	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
8 A middle-east despot	Gave sons key government posts	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
9 A middle-east despot	Built palaces with oil revenues	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
10 Wall Street analyst	Gave clients intentionally flawed advice to benefit his firm	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Generalist examples							
11 Traffic policeman	Demands cash so as not to issue a ticket	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
12 Government official	Requires percentage of contract value	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
13 Purchasing officer	Chooses a supplier, receives crate of whisky	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
14 Roman tax collector	Kept some of the tax he collected	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N

Source: Ian Senior, 2006

General definition of political corruption

The abuse of public office for private gain.

► Mark Philps (2015) definition of political corruption

► Corruption in politics occurs where:

    a. A public official

    b. violates the rules and/or norms of office, to the detriment of the interests of the public who is the designated beneficiary of that office, to benefit themselves and/or a third party,

    c. who rewards or otherwise incentivizes the public official to gain access to goods or services they would not otherwise obtain.

Criteria of Conceptual Goodness

|		
1. Familiarity		How familiar is the concept (to a lay or academic audience)?
2. Resonance		Does the chosen term ring(resonate)?
3. Parsimony		How short is a) the term, and; b)its list of defining attributes (the intension)?
4. Coherence		How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances and attributes?
5. Differentiation		How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from other most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how operationalizable, is the concept?
6. Depth		How many accompanying properties are shared by the instances under definition?
7. Theoretical Utility		How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences?
8. Field Utility		How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?

Source: Gerring (1999, 2012).

▶ Validity refers to the extent to which our measures correspond to the concepts that they are intended to reflect.

▶ Reliability refers to the extent to which the measurement process repeatedly and consistently produces the same score for a given case.

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
Validity and Reliability

Reliable, but Not Valid   Valid, but Not Reliable   Valid and Reliable

Source: Gerring (2012)

Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International:

▶ The CPI scores 180 countries and territories by

▶ their perceived levels of public sector corruption,

▶ according to countries' experts and business people,

▶ based on 13 data sources (e.g., World Bank, World Economic Forum, Varieties of Democracy.)

▶ CPI scale: 100 is very clean and 0 is highly corrupt.

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) Around the World

SCORE

Highly Corrupt | 0-9 | 10-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60-69 | 70-79 | 80-89 | 90-100 | Very Clean | No data

Average for CPI Score by Country

individual countries — average line

Notes: N = 1,810. Average from Country-Year (2012-2021).

Average for CPI Score by Region

Notes: N = 1,810. Average from Region-Year (2012-2021).

AFRICAN UNION

33/100

AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
70	Seychelles
58	Cabo Verde
55	Botswana
54	Mauritius
53	Rwanda
49	Namibia
45	Sao Tome and Principe
44	South Africa
44	Tunisia
43	Ghana
43	Senegal
42	Benin
42	Burkina Faso
39	Ethiopia
39	Morocco
39	Tanzania
38	Lesotho
37	Gambia

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
36	Cote d'Ivoire
35	Malawi
34	Sierra Leone
33	Egypt
33	Zambia
33	Algeria
32	Eswatini
31	Gabon
31	Niger
30	Djibouti
30	Togo
30	Kenya
29	Angola
29	Liberia
29	Mali
28	Mauritania
27	Cameroon
27	Uganda
26	Madagascar
26	Mozambique

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
25	Guinea
24	Nigeria
24	Central African Republic
23	Zimbabwe
22	Eritrea
21	Congo
21	Guinea Bissau
20	Chad
20	Comoros
20	Sudan
19	Burundi
19	Democratic Republic of the Congo
17	Equatorial Guinea
17	Libya
13	Somalia
11	South Sudan

SCORE

Highly Corrupt — Very Clean

0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100   No data

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ARAB STATES

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
69	United Arab Emirates
63	Qatar
53	Saudi Arabia
52	Oman
49	Jordan
44	Tunisia
43	Kuwait
42	Bahrain
39	Morocco
33	Egypt

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
33	Algeria
30	Djibouti
28	Mauritania
24	Lebanon
23	Iraq
20	Comoros
20	Sudan
17	Libya
16	Yemen
13	Somalia
13	Syria

Palestine is not included in this year's CPI, as it has not been rated by the minimum three sources required.

34/100

AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE

Highly Corrupt | 0-9 | 10-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60-69 | 70-79 | 80-89 | 90-100 | Very Clean | No data

EASTERN EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
55	Georgia
49	Armenia
46	Montenegro
41	Belarus
39	Kosovo
39	North Macedonia
38	Serbia
38	Turkey
37	Kazakhstan
36	Moldova
35	Albania
35	Bosnia and Herzegovina
32	Ukraine
30	Azerbaijan
29	Russia
28	Uzbekistan
27	Kyrgyzstan
25	Tajikistan
19	Turkmenistan

36 /100

AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE

Highly Corrupt 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 Very Clean No data

AMERICAS

43/100
AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
74	Canada
73	Uruguay
67	Chile
67	United States of America
65	Barbados
64	Bahamas
59	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
58	Costa Rica
56	Saint Lucia
55	Dominica
53	Grenada
46	Cuba
44	Jamaica
41	Trinidad and Tobago
39	Colombia

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
39	Guyana
39	Suriname
38	Argentina
38	Brazil
36	Ecuador
36	Panama
36	Peru
34	El Salvador
31	Mexico
30	Bolivia
30	Dominican Republic
30	Paraguay
25	Guatemala
23	Honduras
20	Haiti
20	Nicaragua
14	Venezuela

SCORE

Highly Corrupt — Very Clean

0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100   No data

ASIA PACIFIC

45/100
AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
88	New Zealand
85	Singapore
76	Hong Kong
73	Australia
73	Japan
68	Bhutan
68	Taiwan
62	Korea, South
55	Fiji
48	Malaysia
45	China
45	Vanuatu
43	Solomon Islands
41	Timor-Leste
40	India

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
40	Maldives
39	Vietnam
38	Indonesia
37	Sri Lanka
35	Mongolia
35	Thailand
33	Nepal
33	Philippines
31	Papua New Guinea
30	Laos
28	Myanmar
28	Pakistan
26	Bangladesh
23	Cambodia
16	Afghanistan
16	Korea, North

SCORE

Highly Corrupt — Very Clean

| 0-9 | 10-19 | 20-29 | 30-39 | 40-49 | 50-59 | 60-69 | 70-79 | 80-89 | 90-100 | No data |

WESTERN EUROPE
& EUROPEAN UNION

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
88	Denmark
88	Finland
85	Norway
85	Sweden
84	Switzerland
82	Netherlands
81	Luxembourg
80	Germany
78	United Kingdom
74	Iceland
74	Ireland
74	Estonia
74	Austria
73	Belgium
71	France

SCORE	COUNTRY/TERRITORY
62	Portugal
61	Lithuania
61	Spain
59	Latvia
57	Slovenia
56	Italy
56	Poland
54	Czechia
54	Malta
53	Cyprus
52	Slovakia
49	Greece
47	Croatia
45	Romania
43	Hungary
42	Bulgaria

66/100

AVERAGE SCORE

SCORE

Highly Corrupt — Very Clean

0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 No data

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Correlation between Democracy Index (V–Dem) and
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Notes:
Pearson Correlation = 0.65.
Data: CPI and V–DEM Project.

Correlation between Democracy Index (V–Dem) and
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)

Notes:
Pearson Correlation = 0.65.
Data: CPI and V–DEM Project.

The Effects of Corruption on Voter Behavior

Pavão, Nara. 2018. "Corruption as the only option: The limits to electoral accountability." *The Journal of Politics* 80 (3): 996–1010.

Accountability (Fearon 1999)

One person, A, is accountable to another person, B, if two conditions are met:

1. There is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B.

2. B is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her activities or performance in this capacity.

Political Accountability (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999)

Governments are "accountable" if voters can discern whether governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately (e.g., voting for incumbent or opposition).

▶ Research question:

Why corrupt politicians survive democratic elections?

▶ Previous answers in the literature:

1. Informational argument: voters do not punish corruption because they lack information about politicians' misdeeds (Chong et al. 2010; Ferrazand Finan 2008; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013).

2. Trade-off argument: voters do not always punish corruption because they are often willing to trade it for other aspects of government performance about which they care more (Muñoz et al. 2012; Peters and Welch 1980; Rundquist et al. 1977; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2013).

"Corruption as the only option" (Pavão 2018)

▶ Research question:

Why corrupt politicians survive democratic elections?

▶ Answer:

When voters believe corruption to be a constant among
candidate options and that all politicians are equally
incompetent to deal with corruption, they become less likely
to base their vote on corruption concerns and to throw the
rascals out. Therefore, undermining the electoral
accountability.

▶ The perceived lack of competence of politicians to handle corruption can be traced to three specificities of corruption:

1. Corruption is an activity that benefits politicians personally (leading to a conflict of interest).

2. Because political corruption is a feature of the policy-making process, rather than a policy outcome (such as economic or social policies), voters may perceive it to be a systemic problem.

3. Corruption is an issue that can affect not only the incumbent government but also members of the opposition.

H1. Voters are less likely to identify a politician or a political party that is competent to deal with corruption rather than with other issues.

H2. When voters perceive all choice options to be equally incompetent to deal with corruption, they be-come less likely to punish corruption.

H3. As aggregate levels of corruption increase, voters become more likely to perceive all politicians and political parties to be incompetent in dealing with corruption.

▶ Focus-group (Brazil).

▶ Surveys (Brazil and 50 other countries).

▶ Experiments (Brazil).

Figure 1. Percentage of respondents who believed no candidate was capable of dealing with corruption versus other issues, 2009–10. Source: Instituto Análise.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward political parties. Source: Fundação Perseu Abramo, 2012

Table 1. Lack of Choice Options and Corruption Voting: Model 1

	Honesty	SE
No choice option (corruption)	−.175**	.062
Age	.144*	.073
Education	.0106	.024
Income	.0457	.073
Male	.118	.191
Urban	.359	.284
Political interest	−.229*	.105
Corruption salience	−.0480	.284
Constant	−2.049***	.559

Note. $N = 1,029.$ * $p < .05.$ ** $p < .01.$ *** $p < .001.$

Dependent variable: A binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent declares his vote choice to be motivated by the honesty of a candidate or 0 if he indicates using a different voting criteria.

Independent variable: A five-point scale representing ascending levels of agreement from the statement, "all politicians steal." The greater the value, more strongly the respondent believes that all politicians are corrupt.

Figure 3. Effect of corruption levels on cynicism (model 3)

Dependent variable: Voters' skepticism regarding a party or candidate's capacity to handle corruption, based on the CSES survey question, "Thinking of the most important political problem facing [the country]: which [party/presidential candidate] do you think is best at dealing with it?" Answer of interest: None of the parties/candidates.

Independent variable: Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rescaled, which varies from 0 (i.e., the lowest level of corruption) to 10 (i.e., the highest level of corruption).

▶ Empirical evidence (data) does not "confirm" hypotheses; it either "supports " or "does not support" them.

▶ Different research designs test different things.

Cantú, Francisco. 2019. "Groceries for votes: The electoral returns of vote buying." *The Journal of Politics* 81 (3): 790–804.

▶ Research questions:

Does vote buying alter voters' ballot preferences? If yes, what are the returns of vote buying?

► Research questions:

Does vote buying alter voters' ballot preferences? If yes, what are the returns of vote buying?

Vote buying (Nichter 2014; Stokes et al. 2013; Cantú 2019)

The discretional, individual, and quid pro quo provision of rewards to voters.

Previous empirical evidence: Null findings.

According to Cantú (2019), the lack of evidence regarding electoral returns from vote buying comes from two empirical issues:

1. When more than one party engages in this practice, the shifts in voters' preferences are canceled out in the aggregate.

2. Voters' valuations of the handout are not uniform, and their responses on the ballot depend on what is involved in the transaction (e.g., different vote-buying methods and difference in voters' responsive to vote-buying efforts).

Cantú's (2019) contributions:

1. The empirical analysis explores an event when an innovation for a vote-buying transaction gave one of the parties a temporary advantage over its rivals.

2. The empirical design distinguishes those voters identified in the literature as the most responsive to the vote-buying efforts;

3. The data allow to rule out reverse causality in the analysis.

The empirical advantage of the study comes from the exogenous location of the stores where voters could redeem the vote-buying reward and the fact that this type of reward allocation did not affect the results of previous elections.

H1. Voters should electorally support the party that offered the reward instead of the party they have previously supported.

H2. This effect should intensify with voters' proximity to the closest store.

- ▶ Electoral and sociodemographic information for the precincts in Mexico City and the State of Mexico.

- ▶ Dependent variables:
  - ▶ Candidates' vote shares and turnout rates in the 2012 presidential election.

- ▶ Main independent variables:
  - ▶ *Proximity*: The inverse distance (in km) between the centroid of the precinct i and its closest Soriana store.

  - ▶ *Stronghold*: A dummy variable with a value of 1 when party j received the majority of the votes in precinct i during the previous federal election.

  - ▶ *HighMobilization*: A dummy variable with a value of 1 if the turnout rate at precinct i in the previous federal election was at least 1 standard deviation above the overall participation rate.

Table 2. Marginal Effects of Proximity to Soriana on Voting Behavior in the 2012 Presidential Election

	Peña Nieto	López Obrador	Vázquez Mota	Turnout
PRI stronghold	−.087	−.005	−.053	−.167
	(.051)	(.053)	(.058)	(.096)
PRD stronghold	29.757	−20.962	1.097	7.204
	(12.704)	(7.207)	(8.330)	(9.612)
PAN stronghold	−2.984	−4.622	4.693	−3.422
	(1.870)	(.680)	(2.084)	(1.208)

Note. Marginal effects of Proximity estimated as the inverse distance in kilometers between precinct i and the closest Soriana store, as denoted in eq. (2). Average change on the vote shares by changing the proximity to Soriana in 1/distance in kilometers units. Standard errors are in parentheses. PRI = Institutional Revolutionary Party; PRD = Party of the Democratic Revolution; PAN = National Action Party.

Figure 2. Estimated vote share for each candidate with respect to the PRD mobilized strongholds at different values of Proximity to the Soriana stores. Values of HighMobilization and PRDStronghold are fixed at 1; Proximity varies within the [1/20, 1/2.5] interval. Lines depict the point estimates for each vote result, and ribbons represent 95% confidence intervals.

► External validity.

► Inferences beyond what the evidence allows (e.g., vote-buying strategy by PRI).

▶ **Thursday, 5 May.**

Week 9. Voters' Party Perceptions and Representation

Compulsory readings:

– Adams, James. 2012. "Causes and electoral consequences of party policy shifts in multiparty elections: Theoretical results and empirical evidence." *Annual Review of Political Science* 15: 401–419.

– Werner, Annika. 2019. "What voters want from their parties: Testing the promise- keeping assumption." *Electoral Studies* 57: 186–195.

– Fortunato, David. 2021. "Parties and Voters under Coalition Governance." Chap. 3 in The Cycle of Coalition: How Parties and Voters Interact under Coalition Governance, 20–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.