Explore how the selectorate, winning coalition, and loyalty norm shape governance — from kleptocracy to democracy.
A coalition member considering defection has only a W/S probability of making it into the challenger's new coalition. The smaller this ratio, the riskier defection is — so members stay loyal, and the leader can pay them less.
Drag the sliders to see how the loyalty norm determines the leader's bargaining power.
Same tax revenue, different selectorates — see how W/S alone changes everything.
Leaders prefer private goods (contracts, land, tax breaks) because they create lock-in. But as the coalition W grows, each member's share T/W shrinks — until it falls below the value of public goods, and the leader must switch strategies.
Watch the T/W curve cross the public goods threshold as you increase the coalition size. The chart uses a logarithmic scale so you can see both small and large values clearly.
At what coalition size do private goods per member fall below the public goods value?
Selectorate theory's core insight: civic-minded leaders are neither necessary nor sufficient for good governance. What matters is the institutional structure — W and W/S — not personal virtue.
Small W, small W/S — cheap loyalty, maximum discretion, hardest to overthrow. The leader extracts a massive surplus for personal enrichment or patronage.
Small W, large W/S — lavish private goods (fewer people sharing the pie) and the leader cannot easily replace them (high W/S makes defection safe).
Large W, large W/S — this maximizes public goods provision, the only benefit those outside the coalition are likely to receive.
Click a scenario to see what selectorate theory predicts.
Place a hypothetical country on the W vs. W/S grid and see the predicted governance outcome.
8 questions on selectorate theory. See how well you've grasped the logic.